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Nowadays it is widely accepted among scholars that civil and political rights 
are in their nature generally no different from economic and social rights, and 
that both categories of rights can impose three different types of duties: to respect, 
to protect and to fulfil. This indivisibility of rights has also been proclaimed in 
conclusions of various human rights conferences. Although the interconnection and 
indivisibility of all human rights have been stressed from the very beginning of the 
human rights discussion in theory, in practice they have never been equally protec-
ted. The reasons for that kind of discrepancy will be analysed in this paper. Also, 
the current position of civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic 
and social rights on the other within regional and global human rights instru-
ments will be looked at, and this presentation will be followed by a discussion of 
the theoretical approaches to differences between these two categories of rights, if 
any. The aim of this paper is to show that despite the theoretical indivisibility of 
rights, in practice they are far from indivisible.
Keywords: civil and political rights, economic and social rights, indivisibility 
of rights, global and regional human rights systems 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, human rights have been divided into three categories or gen-
erations of rights. Civil and political rights were considered to be ‘first gen-
eration’ rights, economic and social ‘second generation’ rights, whereas the 
‘third generation’ rights were rights of solidarity.1 This was due to the fact 
that at the beginning of the human rights era there existed in legal theory a 
well-established view that civil and political rights were duties of restraint, 
preventing the state from interfering with individual freedom rather than cast-
ing positive duties to act on the state. As such, they were thought to be more 
appropriate for judicial resolution than economic and social rights. Protection 
by the state against want or need was to be assigned to the realm of policy, 
and economic and social rights to the realm of aspiration. However, nowadays, 
in theory, there is a recognition of the unity between civil and political rights 
and economic and social rights. Nevertheless, this recognition of their unity 
is more theoretical then practical. Although numerous authors keep stressing 
their interconnection, indivisibility and interdependence2, in reality the situ-
ation is different and the conclusion that these two groups of rights are no 
longer separable is rather premature.3 
Nevertheless, the classic distinction between civil and political rights as 
negative and determinate rights that have no budgetary implications and are 
appropriate for immediate implementation, and economic and social rights 
as positive and vague rights that are financially demanding and can be only 
achieved progressively, is no longer acceptable.4 In this paper the current de-
1 The proposal for three generations of rights can be found in Vasek, K. ‘A 30-Year 
Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to give Force of Law to the UDHR’ 30(11) UNESCO 
Courier (1977), at p. 29 and in Matulović, M. ‘Prava čovjeka’ in Hrvatska enciklopedija, 
Vol. 8, Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2006, at pp. 727-729.
2 Van Boven, T. ‘Categories of Rights’ in: Moeckli, D. et al. (eds.), International Human 
Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, at p. 173; An-Na’im, A. A. ‘To Affirm the 
Full Human Rights Standing of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in: Ghai, Y. and 
Cottrell, J. (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Practice, The Role of Judges in 
Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Interights, 2004; Scott, C. ‘Reaching 
Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”’ 
21 Hum. Rts. Q. (1999) 633; and Fredman, S., Human Rights Transformed: Positive 
Rights and Positive Duties, Oxford University Press, 2008, at pp. 66-91.
3 Khaliq, U. and Churchill, R., ‘The Protection of Economic and Social Rights: A Particular 
Challenge?’ in Keller, H. and Ulfstein, G. (eds.), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law 
and Legitimacy, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
4 See Eide, A. ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Eide, A. et al. 
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bate over the distinction between civil and political rights, and economic and 
social rights will be presented. Firstly, the way in which the two categories of 
rights are given effect to in regional and global instruments will be analysed. 
This will be followed by an exploration of the more theoretical debates over 
the nature of the two sets of rights. It will be shown that although they might 
be indivisible in theory, they are still rather separate in practice. 
2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRU-
MENTS 
One of the most explicit proclamations of indivisibility of civil and political 
rights and economic and social rights is contained in the Vienna Declarati-
on and Programme of Action from 1993 which states as follows: “Human 
Rights are (…) indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing and with the same emphasis (…).”5 This viewpoint dates 
back to the 1948 United Nations (UN) resolution at the time of the adoption 
of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. What is interesting is that this line 
of thought was stated even when the UN General Assembly in the 1966 Se-
paration Resolution decided to separate the rights and adopt two covenants, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
However, both of these documents declare in their preambles that the full 
and equal enjoyment of all human rights is a prerequisite for all human rights. 
Later on, this viewpoint was restated in the Proclamation of Teheran, adopted 
as the final act of the first international conference on human rights: “Since 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of 
civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultu-
ral rights is impossible. The achievement of lasting progress in the implemen-
tation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and 
international policies of economic and social development.”6 
(eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A Textbook, Kluwer Law International, 
2001. 
5 UN General Assembly, The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action from 
1993, A/CONF.157/23, para. 5.
6 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human 
Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, (1968) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3, 
para. 13.
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The next proclamation was the above quoted proclamation from the Vi-
enna world conference and the Final Document from the 2005 World Summit 
reaffirmed this statement.7 Again, in 2006 the UN General Assembly Reso-
lution, establishing the Human Rights Council, stated in the preamble “that 
all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing, and that all human rights must be treated in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis.”8 Despite all 
these proclamations, civil and political rights are still most often placed under 
a different document than economic and social rights and their compliance 
mechanism is almost never the same.
2.1. THE UN SYSTEM
On the UN level, the ICCPR has been ratified by all the major states except 
China, which shows that protection of civil and political rights is widely accep-
ted worldwide.9 It has a monitoring body, the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), consisting of independent experts monitoring implementation of the 
ICCPR by its State Parties. All States Parties are obliged to submit regular re-
ports to the HRC on how the rights are being implemented. States must report 
initially one year after acceding to the ICCPR and then whenever the HRC 
so requests (usually every four years). The HRC examines each report and 
addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State Party in the form of 
concluding observations. 
In addition to the Reporting procedure, Article 41 of the ICCPR provides 
for the HRC to consider inter-state complaints. The system of inter-state com-
plaints operates on the basis of reciprocity. Furthermore, the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR10 gives the HRC competence to examine individual 
complaints with regard to alleged violations of the ICCPR by States Parties to 
the Protocol.
7 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 24 
October 2005, A/RES/60/1, para. 121.
8 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council: resolution/adopted by the General 
Assembly, 3 April 2006, A/RES/60/251, preamble, para. 3.
9 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, at p. 171. 
10 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force on March 23, 1976.
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On the other hand, the ICESR protects economic, social and cultural 
rights.11 It is important to point out that the ICESCR has not been ratified by 
the USA. There is great reluctance of the USA towards giving economic and 
social rights legal status since it considers civil and political rights as the only 
‘real’ rights.12 This approach is sometimes visible even with the states that 
have ratified the ICESCR, like the United Kingdom, with regard to which the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its Obser-
vations in 1997, 2002 and 2009 stated that the Covenant had still not been 
incorporated into the domestic legal order and could not be directly invoked 
before the courts. The CESCR also pointed out its regrets regarding the sta-
tement made by the UK’s delegation that economic, social and cultural rights 
are mere principles and values and that most of the rights contained in the 
ICESCR are not justiciable.13 Unlike the USA, the UK has accepted economic 
and social rights as actual rights and not only goals, however, it is argued by 
the UK government that they differ in nature form civil and political rights.14
The ICESCR, unlike the ICCPR, does not require states to take imme-
diate steps regarding the full realisation of the rights contained in it, but it 
urges contracting parties to “take steps, individually and through internati-
onal assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appro-
11 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, at p. 3. See more 
on the webpage of the ICESCR: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm> 
accessed 3 February 2013.
12 “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are at best goals and not guarantees or 
entitlements, and the working of the free market is the best and fastest way to 
achieve these development goals.” The US spokesperson in the Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Right to Development, Report of the Open-Ended Working 
Group on the Right to Development, 20 March 2001, UN Doc E/CN4/2001/26, at p. 
46.
13 CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, May 2009, E/C.12/GBR/CO/5 [12] and [13]; CESCR, Report on the twenty-
eight and twenty-ninth session, CESCR E/2003/22 [214]; CESCR, Report on the 
sixteen and seventeen sessions, CESCR E/1998/22, para. 293.   
14 The same approach is expressed by the Polish government. See CESCR, Fifth 
Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN 
Doc E/C.12/GBR/5, paras. 71-75; CESCR, Fifth Periodic Report of Poland, UN 
Doc E/C.12/POL/5; and CESCR, Concluding Observations: Poland, E/C.12/POL/
CO/5, 2 December 2009, para. 8.
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priate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”15 
Therefore, unlike in the ICCPR, the realization of the rights enshrined in it 
is not immediate, but progressive. Despite this provision the CESCR has in 
its General Comments declared certain rights to be of immediate effect and 
in relation to other rights certain steps, towards realisation of the rights must 
be taken within a reasonable time of a state becoming a party to the ICESCR 
(see infra section 1. C). The implementation of the IESCR by the State Parties 
is monitored by the CESCR, a body of independent experts. All States Parties 
are obliged to submit regular reports to the CESCR on how the rights are being 
implemented. States must report initially within two years of accepting the 
ICESCR and thereafter every five years. The CESCR examines each report and 
addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State Party in the form of 
‘concluding observations’. 
In June 2008 the UN Human Rights Council adopted the Optional Proto-
col to the ICESCR16 which provides for the CESCR to receive communications 
from individuals or groups claiming to be victims concerning any rights in the 
ICESCR. The Optional Protocol is not in force yet as it requires ten ratifica-
tions and has only obtained eight so far.17
Therefore, the UN system has, in its main human rights instruments - the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR, strictly separated economic and social rights from 
civil and political rights, by protecting them within two different instruments 
and with two different monitoring bodies. The form of monitoring is the same, 
or at least it will be when the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR enters into 
force. Thus the crucial difference remains that rights in the ICCPR are of 
immediate application, whereas those in the ICESCR are progressive. It also 
needs to be pointed out that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women contain both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural 
rights. However, these examples do not undermine the dominant pattern of 
separation present in the main UN human rights instruments, the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR. 
15 ICESCR, Article 2(1).
16 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted by the Resolution A/RES/63/117, on 10 December 2008.
17 Spain, Slovakia, Mongolia, El-Salvador, Ecuador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia 
and Argentina (on February 2013).
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2.2. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SYSTEM
Within the Council of Europe (CoE) system, civil and political rights are 
also separated from economic and social rights. The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), a document on civil and political rights, was adopted 
in 1950 within the CoE. It entered into force in 1953 and has been ratified 
by all forty-seven Member States of the CoE. Today, it is an obligation of all 
states wishing to become a member of the CoE to ratify the ECHR. 
The European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) was set up in 1959. The 
original structure of the ECtHR and mechanism for handling cases provided 
for a two-tier system of rights protection, which included the European Com-
mission of Human Rights as well as the ECtHR itself. When the caseload star-
ted to grow the idea of merging the Commission and the ECtHR was born. On 
1 November 1998, Protocol 11 came into force, eliminating the Commission 
and establishing a new full-time ECtHR that replaced the former system. All 
the states that have ratified the ECHR are now under the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR that can deliver binding judgments concerning those states. 
A finding by the ECtHR that a violation of the ECHR or its Protocols 
has been made places an obligation on the respondent state to abide by the 
judgment. The ECtHR can receive both individual and inter-state complaints, 
although inter-state complaints tend to be quite rare. As to individual appli-
cants, there are today 800 million potential applicants, since all the people 
living under jurisdiction of State Parties have direct access to the ECtHR in 
order to complain against violations of their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Approximately 151,600 applications were pending before a judicial formation 
as of 1 January 2012. 
The situation is somewhat different as concerns economic and social rights. 
Forty-three Member States of the CoE have ratified either the Original or 
the Revised European Social Charter (ESC). The ESC makes a distinction 
between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ rights and it is unique among human rights trea-
ties since it permits its parties not to accept all the rights it contains.18 In the 
18 “Each of the Parties undertake: a. to consider Part I of this Charter as a declaration 
of the aims which it will pursue by all appropriate means, as stated in the introductory 
paragraph of that part; b. to consider itself bound by at least six of the following 
nine articles of Part II of this Charter: Articles 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20; c. 
to consider itself bound by an additional number of articles or paragraphs of Part 
II of the Charter which it may select, provided that the total number of articles or 
numbered paragraphs by which it is bound is not less than sixteen articles or sixty-
three numbered paragraphs.” Part III, Article A (1) of the Revised ESC.
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Original ESC there are seven ‘core’ rights19 while the Revised ESC adds two 
further ‘core’ rights – the right of children to protection and the right to equal 
opportunities and treatment in employment. The second category of rights 
comprises ‘non-core’ rights.20 The probable reason for the distinction between 
‘core’ and ‘non-core’ rights and for allowing states not to accept all the rights 
from the ESC are the considerable differences in the level of economic and 
social progress among members of the CoE.21 The consequence is that it is 
unlikely that many members to the CoE are subject to the same set of obliga-
tions under the ESC.22 
As to the compliance mechanism under the ESC, there are two forms of 
machinery seeking to ensure that parties comply with obligations under the 
ESC. The first is the system of Reporting which has been in existence since 
1961 and is obligatory for all the State Parties to the ESC. As to the second 
mechanism, the system of Collective Complaints, it was introduced in 1995 
and has been in force since 1998. It has been ratified by only 15 Member 
States to date.23 The ratification of the ESC does not oblige states to accept the 
jurisdiction of the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) in Collective 
Complaints procedure, as the ratification of the ECHR does for the jurisdic-
tion of the ECtHR. Ratification of the ESC only obliges states to make reports 
to the ECSR on their implementation of the accepted provisions of the ESC. 
It is left for the states to decide whether they accept the Collective Complaint 
19 The rights to work; to form trade unions and employers’ associations; to bargain 
collectively; to social security; to social and medical assistance; to social, legal and 
economic protection for the family; and to protection for migrant workers.
20 In the Original ESC these rights are: the rights to just conditions of work; safe and 
healthy working conditions; fair remuneration; vocational guidance and training; 
special protection for children, women, the handicapped and migrants; health; 
social welfare services; and special protection for mothers and children, families, 
the handicapped and the elderly, while the Additional Protocol to the ESC from 
1998 adds four more rights and the Revised ESC adds eight more non-core rights.
21 Gomien, D., Harris, D. J. and Zwaak, L., Law and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the European Social Charter, Council of Europe Publishing, 
1996, at p. 379.
22 European Social Charter, Table of Accepted Provisions (situation on July 2012):
 <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ProvisionTa-
bleRevJuly2012_en.pdf> accessed 14 February 2013.
23 Those are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden. It is 
interesting that the United Kingdom has not accepted the Collective Complaints 
Procedure which also shows its attitude towards the legal status of economic and 
social rights. 
Zbornik PFZ, 64, (2) 307-332 (2014) 315
procedure that authorises the ECSR to adopt decisions, which although not 
judicial, do have a quasi-judicial character. 
What seems obvious is that in Europe the acceptance of regional supervi-
sion of civil and political rights is widely accepted, while the same cannot be 
said for economic and social rights. 
The Inter-American and the African regional systems will now be briefly 
presented.
2.3. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights is governed 
by three legal instruments: the Charter of the Organization of American States 
(OAS Charter), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
and the American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR) (with its addition-
al Protocols).24 In the human rights area the most important legal document, 
the one that constitutes a directly binding treaty, is the AmCHR.25
The AmCHR was adopted in 1969 and it entered into force almost ten 
years later, in 1978. The same year when the AmCHR was adopted it was 
decided to establish the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR), 
but the I-ACtHR came into effect in 1978 and began to operate only after its 
Statute was established in the year 1980.26 
The primary organs of the Inter-American human rights system are the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights (I-AComHR) and the I-ACtHR. 
The I-ACtHR has both contentious and advisory functions and it is composed 
of seven part-time, independent judges nominated in their individual capa-
city by the States parties to the AmCHR. However, States parties are subject 
24 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Protocol of San Salvador’, O.A.S. Treaty 
Series No. 69 (1988), entered into force November 16, 1999, reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/
Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, at 67 (1992), and the Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights Relative to the Abolition of Death Penalty (1990), 
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 73 (1990), not in force yet.
25 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force on 18 July 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 
doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992).
26 See more on the web page of the Inter-American Human Rights System at <http://
www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=413> accessed 4 February 2013. 
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to the I-ACtHR’s contentious jurisdiction only upon making an independent 
declaration recognizing the I-ACtHR’s jurisdiction. Even then, the I-ACtHR 
can only adjudicate cases submitted to it by the I-AcomHR or States parties to 
the AmCHR. “Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity 
legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lod-
ge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of 
violation of this Convention by a State Party.”27 Therefore, individuals cannot 
act before the I-ACtHR, but only before the I-AComHR.
The AmCHR divides the protected rights into two categories under sepa-
rate chapters, where chapter II declares civil and political rights and chapter 
III economic, social and cultural rights. However, the AmCHR actually con-
sists of mainly civil and political rights, since twenty three of the twenty four 
protected rights fall under the civil and political rights chapter. The AmCHR 
contains only reference to economic, social and cultural rights in Article 26. 
Furthermore, the structure of this Article clearly shows it is not intended for 
protection on the same level as civil and political rights since it urges states “to 
adopt measures … with a view of achieving progressively … the full realization 
of the rights”.28 
The Additional Protocol in the Matter of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) has been adopted and its aim is to fill the 
gap in the AmCHR regarding economic and social rights. The Protocol has 
been ratified by only 15 of the 24 parties to the AmCHR. It was designed 
to change the situation with economic, social and cultural rights within the 
AmCHR system. However, under Article 19(6) of the Protocol the only right 
to organize trade unions (as set out under Article 8(1)(a)) and the right to edu-
cation (as set out under Article 13) are subject to the contentious jurisdiction 
of the I-ACtHR and the I-AComHR. 
Therefore, the judicial protection of economic and social rights is still lar-
gely underdeveloped and the Inter-American judicial protection of economic 
and social rights has not generally involved express reliance upon, and enforce-
ment of, economic and social rights under the AmCHR, its Protocols and the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.29 
27 Article 44 of the AmCHR.
28 Article 26 of the AmCHR.
29 In its case law on the rights of indigenous people the I-ACtHR has interpreted 
various civil and political rights (such as the right to life) to give protection to a 
range of socio-economic rights and interests (such as the right to food, the right to 
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2.4. THE AFRICAN SYSTEM
The African human rights system is the newest regional system and it is con-
siderably less developed than the American and the European systems. It is based 
on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the AfCHPR, the Banjul 
Charter)30, which entered into force in October 1986. Today, the AfCHPR has 
been ratified by all fifty-three members of the Organisation of African Union 
(OAU).31 In June 1998, the OAU adopted the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights.32 The OAU was transformed in 2002 into the African 
Union (AU).33 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) has specific 
characteristics that distinguish it from the AmCHR and the ECHR in order to 
satisfy the specific needs of Africa. First of all, the AfCHPR reflects the wish of 
Member States of the OAU to maintain their distance from both the East and 
the West in their conception of the ideological function of human rights. Fur-
thermore, the AfCHPR adopts a dialectic approach by correlating rights with 
corresponding duties. Also, according to the AfCHPR, the realization of indi-
vidual rights can find its fullest expression and fulfilment only within the context 
of the community. And finally, the AfCHPR adopted an integrated approach to 
human rights, placing the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights on 
the same footing as civil and political rights.34 
The institutional framework concerning human rights of the AU consists of 
the assembly of Heads of State and Government which is the supreme organ 
education and the right to health care). See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v 
Paraguay, Judgment of 24 August 2010, Series C No. 214.
30 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981).
31 The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the OAU, the official body of the African states. The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis 
Ababa, on signature of the OAU Charter by representatives of 32 governments. 
32 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the Organization of African Unity, Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, 
June 1998, OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.(1) Rev.2.
33 Constitutive Act of the African Union, CAB/LEB/23.15 (26 May 2001).
34 Okere, O. ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American System’ 6 
Hum. Rts. Q. (1984) 141, at p. 145.
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of the AU. Furthermore, there are the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (AfComHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (AfCtHPR). 
The AfCtHPR has the competence to render final and binding decisions on 
human rights violations. Currently there are twenty six AU Member States that 
have ratified the Protocol establishing the Court.35 Despite the AfCtHPR, the 
AfComHPR still remains important in the individual complaints process since 
it has the role of taking the case to the AfCtHPR (only the AfComHPR and 
the states have automatic locus standi before the AfCtHPR). The AfComHPR 
has, through its work, even read certain economic and social rights into the 
AfCHPR, like the right to adequate housing and the right to health.36 On the 
other hand, very few judgments were rendered by the Court before February 
2013, and in most of them it found it had no jurisdiction to hear the case.37 
Therefore, although the interconnection and indivisibility of all human 
rights has been stressed from the very beginning of the human rights discu-
ssion, in practice they have, at least so far, not been equally protected. As 
expressed by A. Cassese, “this convenient catch-phrase serves to dampen the 
debate while leaving everything the way it was.”38 Despite the proclamations 
of their indivisibility, they are far from being indivisible on both the regional 
and the global level.
3. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL AND ECONO-
MIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS – ARE THERE ANY?
It is evident from the previous section that generally civil and political 
rights enjoy better legal protection and are more accepted within states as 
35 AfCtHPR <http://www.african-court.org/en/> accessed 4 February 2013.
36 See SERAC & CESR v Nigeria, Com. No. 155/96 (2001), para. 60; African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights (November 2010), para. 77 on the right to housing; 
and Purohit and Moore vs the Gambia, Com. No. 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (where 
the AfComHR stated that the Gambia did not satisfy Articles 16 and 18(4) of the 
AfCHPR and that enjoyment of the right to health is crucial to the realisation 
of other fundamental rights and freedoms and includes the right of all to health 
facilities, as well as access to goods and services, without discrimination of any 
kind). 
37 Judgments and Orders of the Court are available on the AfCtHPR website (n 35).
38 Cassese, A., ‘Are Human Rights Truly Universal?’ in Savić, O. (ed.), The Politics of 
Human Rights, Verso, 1999, at p. 159.
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being justiciable. Nevertheless, although differences between economic and 
social rights on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other still 
exist, they are not nearly as sharp and clear as they were believed to be at the 
beginning of the international human rights era.
The original idea of traditionalists in separating economic and social from 
civil and political rights arose from the perception of civil and political rights 
as negative in their nature while of economic and social rights as positive. The 
negative character of rights means that they do impose negative obligations on 
states, and negative obligations require refraining from action, while positive 
ones require action. The division into civil and political rights, as imposing 
only negative obligations, and economic and social rights, as imposing only 
positive, is nowadays completely abandoned. Most civil and political rights, 
in order to be effective, also require some positive state action and fifty years 
of jurisprudence of the ECtHR clearly confirms this. A superficial look at the 
rights contained in the ECHR as protected by the ECtHR shows that most 
civil and political rights entail some positive obligation on the states.39 Even 
the rights that are construed negatively, such as the right not to be subjected to 
torture, require numerous positive actions from the states, such as protecting 
vulnerable persons from ill-treatment by others40 or providing healthcare in de-
tention.41 While admittedly economic and social rights often require relatively 
greater state action42 for their realisation than do civil and political rights, this 
39 For example see Airey v Ireland (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 305 concerning Article 6(1) 
of the Convention right of access to a court where the ECtHR found a violation 
of this right due to the state’s failure to provide Mrs Airey with legal aid; Christine 
Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 447 regarding official recognition 
of transsexuals where the ECtHR found that a state has an obligation to provide 
effective legal recognition of the new identities of post-operative transsexuals; 
Dougoz v Greece (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 61 regarding unsatisfactory detention conditions 
the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 due to the state’s failure to provide for 
satisfactory conditions of detention; and Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 
513 regarding failure of the authorities to adequately protect the applicant’s home 
and family life from gases emitted by a waste treatment plant, the ECtHR found a 
violation of Article 8. Also see Mowbray, A., The Development of Positive Obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, 
Hart Publishing, 2004.
40 Z. v United Kingdom (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 3. 
41 Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 38.
42 Although, some economic and social rights are purely negative, such as the right to 
belong to a trade union and for a trade union to carry out its activities (ICESCR, 
Article 8).
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difference separates the two sets of rights rather in terms of degree than in 
kind.43 
With the above stated division came another often made distinction; that 
civil and political rights are resource free, whereas economic and social rights 
or their implementation is resource dependent. However, whether or not a 
right is cost-free will depend on the obligation in question, rather than the 
classification of the right imposing that obligation as either civil and political, 
or economic and social in nature.44 It is true that economic and social rights 
are often more financially demanding than civil and political rights (but not 
always, e.g. requiring the private sector to provide equal pay for equal work), 
but it can hardly be said that civil and political rights are resource free.45
The third division is that economic and social rights are to be achieved pro-
gressively, while civil and political rights are subject to immediate implementa-
tion. This view is confirmed in the Article 2(1) of the IECSR.46
However, despite this provision the CESCR has in its General Comments 
declared certain rights to be of immediate effect. For example, in General 
Comments No. 3 and 9 it has stated that it considers many of the provisions 
in the Covenant to be capable of immediate implementation47 and in General 
43 Alston, P. and Quinn, G., ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1987) 156, at pp. 183-4.
44 Nolan, A., Porter, B. and Langford, M., The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: 
An Updated Appraisal, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper 
Series No. 14, New York University and the Committee on Administration of 
Justice Northern Ireland, 2007, at p. 8.
45 For example, even the quintessential civil and political rights, such as the right to a 
fair trial, have budgetary implications: Airey v Ireland (n 39) para. 26 (where the 
ECtHR said Ireland must either provide legal aid or simplify court proceedings) 
or Article 6(3)(e) of the ECHR guaranteeing the right to free assistance of an 
interpreter if a person charged with a criminal offence cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court.
46 “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”
47 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (1990) E/1991/23: “Article 2 is of particular 
importance to a full understanding of the Covenant and must be seen as having 
a dynamic relationship with all of the other provisions of the Covenant...Thus 
while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, 
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Comments No. 3 it has, regarding all the ICESR rights, stated that regardless 
of the state of development of any country, there are certain steps which must 
be taken immediately.48
The idea that economic and social rights may be of immediate effect was 
also accepted and affirmed in 1986 by the Limburg Principles on the Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultu-
ral Rights: 
“The obligation ‘to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights’ 
requires States parties to move as expeditiously as possible towards the 
realization of the rights. Under no circumstances shall this be interpreted 
as implying for States the right to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure 
full realization. On the contrary all States parties have the obligation 
to begin immediately to take steps to fulfil their obligations under the 
Covenant.”49 
As to the ESC, the rights contained in it are in general not progressive in 
nature, but are of immediate effect. The ECSR has taken the approach un-
der which it requires states to take immediate steps in order to implement 
its decisions in respect of collective complaints and conclusions regarding na-
tional reports. For example, in its Conclusion 2003-1 on France on reducing 
homelessness the ECSR stated that it required “the introduction of measures, 
such as provision of immediate shelter and care for the homeless and meas-
ures to help such people overcome their difficulties and prevent a return to 
homelessness”.50 The same was restated in the Decision on the merits regard-
ing Collective Complaint No. 39/2006.51
steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the 
Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned.” paras. 1-2; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 9 (1998) E/C.12/1998/24 “The Committee has already made clear 
that it considers many of the provisions in the Covenant to be capable of immediate 
implementation. Thus, in General Comment No. 3 it cited, by way of example, 
articles 3; 7, paragraph (a) (i); 8; 10, paragraph 3; 13, paragraph 2 (a); 13, paragraph 
3; 13, paragraph 4; and 15, paragraph 3.” para. 10.
48 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 47) paras. 2 and 9.
49 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Commission on Human Rights, Note 
verbale dated 86/12/05 from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United 
Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights (“Limburg Principles”), 
8 January 1987, E/CN.4/1987/17, para. 21.
50 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2003 Volume 1 (Bulgaria, France, Italy), CoE 
Publishing, 2003, at p. 226.
51 European Federation of National Organisations Working with Homeless (FEANTSA) v 
France (39/2006), (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. SE15, para. 103.
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However, the ESCR has on certain occasions accepted the progressive na-
ture of economic and social rights and made clear that it holds that the realisa-
tion of certain fundamental economic and social rights recognised by the ESC 
is guided by the principle of progressiveness.52
The I-AComHR has also emphasized the duty to take immediate steps 
towards the realisation of economic and social rights, stating that:
“The principle that economic, social and cultural rights are to be achieved 
progressively does not mean that governments do not have the immediate 
obligation to make efforts to attain the full realization of these rights. The 
rationale behind the principle of progressive rights is that governments 
are under the obligation to ensure conditions that, according to the state’s 
material resources, will advance gradually and consistently toward the 
fullest achievement of these rights...
It therefore follows that the obligation of member states to observe and 
defend the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions, as set 
forth in both the American Declaration and the American Convention, 
obligates them, regardless of the level of economic development, to 
guarantee a minimum threshold of these rights.”53
Although we might agree with the statement that on most occasions civil 
and political rights can be achieved within a stricter time limit than economic 
and social rights, the fact remains that both groups of rights can sometimes be 
realised immediately or at least impose obligations on states to start immedia-
tely with their realisation. 
The fourth frequently used argument is that economic and social rights 
are too vague for judicial enforcement, while civil and political rights are de-
terminate. Linked to this argument is the argument of justiciability of eco-
nomic and social rights. An interesting view on this issue has been given by D. 
52 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy (58/2009), (2011) 52 
E.H.R.R. SE6, at para. 26; International Association Autism-Europe v France (13/2002), 
(2004) 11 I.H.R.R. 843, at para. 53. See also General Federation of employees of the 
national electric power corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil 
Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece (66/2011), decision on the merits of 23 
May 2012 where the ESCR recognised the economic crisis faced by Greece, but 
still emphasized that measures introduced to consolidate public finances should not 
undermine the core framework of the national social security system, at para. 47. 
Therefore, the economic crisis will not be sufficient argument for non-compliance 
with the obligations under the ECSR.
53 Inter-Am.Comm.H.R., Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, 1993, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc.9 rev (11 February 1994), Chapter 
VII ‘The principle of progressive realisation’.
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Marcus who wrote that the perception of non-justiciability and the normative 
underdevelopment of economic and social rights act as co-dependent parts of 
a negative feedback mechanism: “States oppose adjudication because the rules 
of decision are vague and imprecise, and these characteristics prevent the ap-
plication of the ‘judicial craft’ to clarify and develop their content.”54
It is true that many of the rights contained in the ICESCR are formulated 
quite broadly, like the right to social security that only says: “The State Parti-
es to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance”55, or the right to work as guaranteed under Article 
6(1).56 However, not all rights under the ICESCR are formulated so vaguely 
and broadly, e.g. the right to primary education as guaranteed under Article 
13(2)(a).57 Also, the fact that rights are formulated vaguely does not automa-
tically mean that they cannot be defined so that the states know what their 
obligations are. Regarding ICESCR the main guidance are General Comments 
adopted by the CESCR58, which although not legally binding are not without 
legal significance. Some of them can even be considered as interpretations of 
the ICESCR.59
As to the ESC, many of its provisions are drafted in sufficiently precise 
terms to be judicially enforceable.60 Furthermore, the ECSR has through its 
decisions on collective complaints61 and conclusions62 on national reports very 
54 Marcus, D., ‘The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational 
Adjudication’ 42 StanJIntL (2006) 53, at p. 55.
55 IECSR, Article 9.
56 IECSR Article 6(1): “The States parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living 
by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to 
safeguard this right.”
57 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving 
the full realization of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and 
available free to all.”
58 See CECSR, General Comment No. 18 (2005) E/C.12/GC/18 on the Right to work.
59 Khaliq, U. and Churchill, R., op. cit. (n 3), at p. 5.
60 See Article 8(1), (2) and (5) of the Revised ESC on the right of employed women 
to protection of maternity.
61 See Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece (30/2005), (2007) 
45 E.H.R.R. SE11, on the obligation of the State to adequately prevent the impact 
for the environment or to develop an appropriate strategy in order to prevent and 
respond to the health hazards for the population; or European Roma Rights Centre 
(ERRC) v Bulgaria (31/2005), (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE10 on the obligation of the 
state to provide adequate housing for Roma people.
62 See ESC, ECSR Conclusions XVII- 2, Volume 1 (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
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clearly stated the obligations of the states regarding certain provisions of the 
ESC. 
The fact is that most civil and political rights in the ECHR are also in no 
way determinate and conclusive, but the ECtHR has given meaning to these 
rights through numerous interpretative methods.63 On the other hand, the 
ECSR members are also entitled to use (and they often do) the same inter-
pretative methods as the ECtHR and thereby determine the meaning of rights 
contained in the ESC. “There are strong arguments in favour of open-textured 
framing of all human rights, so that courts are able to respond adequately 
to individual circumstances and historical developments in concretising their 
meaning over time.”64
Finally, the issue of justiciability of economic and social rights has been 
debated a lot during the last 15 years, and most authors will nowadays agree 
that judicial protection of economic and social rights is possible.65 Part of the 
concern was that adjudicating economic and social rights issues is beyond the 
institutional capacity of the courts. In the paper The Justiciability of Social and 
Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal A. Nolan, B. Palmer and M. Langford 
broke this assertion into four primary claims: (I) that the courts lack the in-
formation required to deal with social and economic rights; (II) that the ju-
diciary lacks the necessary expertise, qualification or experience to deal with 
social and economic rights issues; (III) that the courts are incapable of dealing 
successfully with ‘polycentric’ tasks, such as those entailed by adjudication in-
volving social and economic rights; and (IV) that the courts lack the necessary 
tools and remedies to deal effectively with social and economic rights. Further 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland) (CoE Publishing 2005); 
and ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2007- Volume 1 (Albania, Armenia, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France), CoE Publishing, 2007.
63 Like the doctrine of autonomous concept, the margin of appreciation doctrine or 
the doctrine of effectiveness.
64 Nolan, A., Porter, B. and Langford, M., op. cit. (n 44), at p. 11.
65 Melish, T., Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System: 
A Manual on Presenting Claims, Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human 
Rights, Yale Law School and Centro de Derechos Economicos y Sociales, Ecuador, 
2002, at pp. 33-40; Marcus, D., op. cit. (n 54); Wiley, A. ‘Aspirational Principles of 
Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-economic Rights in National Law’ 22 Am. U. Int’l 
L. Rev. (2006-2007) 35; Baderin, M. A. and McCorquodale, M. ‘The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Forty Years of Development’ in Baderin, 
M. A. and McCorquodale, R. (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, 
Oxford University Press, 2007, at p. 12.  
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on in the text they elaborated arguments against this assertion, claiming that 
the courts do have the necessary capacity to adjudicate economic and social 
rights.66
Acceptance of the justiciability of economic and social rights on the inter-
national plane is shown by a number of developments. The CESCR has as-
serted the justiciability of rights contained in the ICESCR both in its General 
Comments67 and in some of its Statements.68 Also, as already mentioned in 
June 2008 UN Human Rights Council adopted the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR69, which provides for the CESCR to receive communications from 
individuals or groups claiming to be victims of any rights in the ICESCR. 
The ECSR has established a quasi-judicial procedure under the Collective 
Complaints Protocol. Although under this Protocol the ECSR does not have 
the power to deliver binding judgments, it has through a number of decisions 
clearly shown that economic and social rights are capable of legal enforce-
ment. The I-AComHR and the I-ACtHR have also confirmed the justiciability, 
albeit limited, of Article 26 of the AmCHR guaranteeing economic and social 
rights.70 Finally, the African system, at least in theory, makes no difference in 
justiciability of civil and political, and economic and social rights.71
4. TRIPARTITE TYPOLOGY OF OBLIGATIONS 
The classical division into civil and political rights as rights that impose on 
the state the duty to avoid and only exceptionally to protect from deprivation 
(therefore as rights that generally require the non-intervention of the state 
(negative rights)), and economic and social rights as rights that impose duties 
to protect from deprivation and to aid the deprived (therefore as rights that re-
quire active intervention on the part of the state (positive rights)) is nowadays 
66 Nolan, A., Porter, B. and Langford, M., op. cit. (n 44), at pp. 15-18.
67 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 47) [5] and General Comment No. 9 (n 47), 
para. 10.
68 Statement to the Convention to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union <www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/EU.doc> 
accessed 4 February 2013. 
69 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (n 16).
70 Ivanildo Amaro da Silva et al. v Brazil, Case 1198-05, Report No. 38-101, Inter-
Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5, rev. 1 (2010) [26], [41]; Acevedo Buendia et al v 
Peru (I-ACtHR), 1 July 2009, paras. 92-107.  
71 See Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (n 36). 
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rather abandoned. Today mostly accepted is the H. Shue’s idea that for every 
basic right there are three types of correlative duties.72 After H. Shue, A. Eide, 
as the Rappourteur to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, divided all human rights as to whether they 
impose obligations to respect, protect or fulfil. A. Eide described them in the fol-
lowing way: the obligation to respect requires states to abstain from violating a 
right; the obligation to protect requires states to prevent third parties from vio-
lating that right; and the obligation to fulfil requires the state to take measures 
to ensure that the right is enjoyed by those within the state’s jurisdiction.73 
Therefore, both Shue and Eide made no distinction between rights, but 
rather between duties. This tripartite typology of obligations has also been 
applied by the CESCR in General Comments74 and the AfComHPR in its 
decision in Social and Economic Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria75, 
in the African Commission Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights, as well as in the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.76
The obligation to respect requires from the state not to interfere with the 
enjoyment of a guaranteed human right. This obligation applies to all human 
72 Shue, H., Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton 
University Press, 1980, at p. 52. Shue does not believe there are distinctions between 
rights, but only distinction between duties. In his view, the complete fulfilment of 
each kind of right involves the performance of multiple kinds of duties, that is, for 
every basic right there are three types of duties. Therefore, Shue rejected the notion 
that rights can be divided into negative and positive ones. 
73 Eide, A., UN Special Rappourteur for the Right to Food, The Right to Adequate Food 
as a Human Right: Final Report submitted by Asbjørn Eide, (1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1987/23, at pp. 23-24. 
74 CESCR, General Comment No. 21 (2009) E/C.12/GC/21, para. 48; General 
Comment No. 19 (2008) E/C.12/GC/19, paras. 43-51; General Comment No. 18 
(n 58), paras. 22-28; General Comment No. 17 (2005) E/C.12/GC/17, paras. 28-34; 
General Comment No. 16 (2005) E/C.12/2005/4, paras. 17-22; General Comment 
No. 15 (2005) E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 20-29; General Comment No. 14 (2000) 
E/C.12/2000/4, paras. 33-38; General Comment No. 13 (1999) E/C.12/1999/10, 
paras. 46-48.
75 Social and Economic Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 23 
(ACHPR 1995), para. 44.
76 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Maastricht, 22-26 January 1997, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
Maastrichtguidelines_.html> accessed 4 February 2013. 
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rights, civil and political, and economic and social. Fulfilment of the obliga-
tion to respect usually does not place a large financial burden on states, and 
judgments concerning violations of these obligations should be suitable for 
immediate implementation. It is considered that civil and political rights tend 
to place this obligation on states more often, since most civil and political 
rights are construed in a way that they primarily place an obligation on the 
state not to interfere. One example may be Article 3 of the ECHR stating “No 
one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.” The 
same goes for Article 2 that prohibits states to intentionally deprive someone 
of their life or Article 8 that guarantees everyone the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence which are construed 
in a way that they primarily impose obligations to respect. 
However, not only civil and political rights place obligations on the state to 
respect; economic and social rights also require non-interference by the state. 
For example, states are under the obligation to respect the right to health 
by refraining from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including 
prisoners or detainees, minorities, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, to 
preventive, curative and palliative health services; abstaining from enforcing 
discriminatory practices as a state policy; and abstaining from imposing dis-
criminatory practices relating to women’s health status and needs.77 Therefore, 
the obligation to respect is attributable to both categories of rights.
The obligation to protect imposes some positive obligations on states, since 
the state not only has to refrain from acting, but is also required to protect 
individuals from having their rights interfered with by third (i.e. non-state) 
parties.78 Although an obligation to protect has within classical theoretical 
divisions been more attributed to economic and social rights, the HRC, the 
ECtHR and the I-ACtHR have through their interpretation also imposed the 
obligation to protect on civil and political rights. 
The HRC in its General Comment No. 20 concerning the prohibition of 
torture and cruel treatment or punishment stated as follows: 
“It is the duty of the State Party to afford everyone protection through 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts 
prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official 
77 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 74), para. 34.
78 See Nolan, A. ‘Addressing economic and social rights violations by non-state actors through 
the role of the state: a comparison of regional approaches to the “obligation to protect”’ 9(2) 
H.L.R.Rev. 2 (2009) 25.
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capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity. The 
prohibition in article 7 is complemented by the positive requirements 
of article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which stipulates that ‘All 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.’”79 
As to the ECtHR, there are numerous cases where the ECtHR interpreted 
the ECHR as to give rise to obligations to protect. For example, under Article 8 
of the ECHR, the ECtHR has on numerous occasions gone beyond the notion 
to respect, requiring the states to protect individuals’ rights guaranteed under 
Article 8. Here the states have had to protect persons under their jurisdiction 
by changing legislation80, protect the applicants’ private life from environmen-
tal hazards81, or they have had an obligation to protect the right to home by 
preventing evictions without sufficient (procedural) safeguards, all in relation 
to acts by private parties.82 
With the I-ACtHR this approach is visible in Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras 
where the I-ACtHR stated that the State has a legal duty to take reasonable 
steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal 
to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdic-
tion, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and 
to ensure the victim adequate compensation. It also emphasized that an illegal 
act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable 
to a State can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of 
the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation 
or to respond to it as required by the AmCHR.83 
Regarding economic and social rights, in General Comment No. 18, con-
cerning the obligation to protect the right to work, the CESCR stated that it 
includes, inter alia, the duties of States parties to adopt legislation or to take 
other measures ensuring equal access to work and training and to ensure that 
privatization measures do not undermine workers’ rights.84
79 HRC, General Comment No. 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning 
prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Article 7), Forty-fourth 
session, 1992, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 2. 
80 X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 235.
81 Lopez Ostra v Spain (n 39).
82 McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40; Yakovenko v Ukraine App no 
15825/06 (ECtHR, 25 January 2008).
83 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras Inter-AmCtHR (Series C) No 4 (1988), paras. 166-
176.
84 CESCR General Comment No. 18 (n 58), para. 25.
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On the regional level, the ECSR has also emphasized an obligation of the 
state to protect, both in its conclusions and in its decisions. For example, in 
its Conclusions XIV-2 (1998) on Malta it emphasized that it has found no 
information on specific measures (prohibition, protective equipment, permis-
sible maximum exposure levels, etc.) taken to protect workers against dangers 
associated with hazardous biological agents, carcinogenic agents, ionising ra-
diation or asbestos.85 In its decision on the merits in Marangopoulos Foundation 
for Human Rights v Greece the ECSR pointed out that with a view of ensuring 
the effective exercise of the right to a healthy environment within the right to 
health, Article 11 of the ECSR requires States parties to protect public health 
against air pollution resulting from actions of private enterprises. 86 
Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires states to adopt measures to ensure 
the goal of the full realisation of rights to those who cannot secure rights 
themselves.87 The obligation to fulfil is attributed mainly to economic and 
social rights, it is financially demanding, and usually the obligation itself is 
vague and unclear. Regarding the imposition of the obligation to fulfil, the 
reluctance of the judiciary to decide on these matters is most apparent. The 
CECSR has adopted a three-fold classification and divided the obligation to 
fulfil economic, social and cultural into the obligation to facilitate, promote and 
provide. The obligation to facilitate requires states, inter alia, to take positive 
measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy rights 
while the obligation to promote requires states to undertake actions that cre-
ate, maintain and restore the realisation of all rights. Finally, the obligation to 
provide rights arises when individuals or groups are unable, on grounds to be 
reasonably beyond their control, to realise these rights themselves, with the 
means at their disposal.88 
85 ESC, Committee of Independent Experts Conclusions XIV-2 Volume 2 (Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
United Kingdom) (CoE Publishing 1998), at p. 505.
86 Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (n 61), para. 93; See also 
International Commission of Jurists v Portugal (1/1998), decision on the merits of 10 
September 1999, where the ECSR concluded that the satisfactory application of 
Article 7 cannot be ensured solely by the operation of legislation if this is not 
effectively applied and rigorously supervised, para. 32.
87 Ssenyonjo, M., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Hart 
Publishing, 2009, at p. 25. 
88 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 74), para. 37; General Comment No. 15 (n 74), 
para. 25; General Comment No. 17 (n 74), para. 34; General Comment No. 18 (n 58), 
paras. 26-28; General Comment No. 19 (n 74), paras. 47-50; General Comment No. 
21 (n 74), paras. 51-54. See also Ssenyonjo, M., op. cit. (n 87), at p. 25.
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The ECSR has on numerous occasions stressed the obligation of State Par-
ties to promote, facilitate and to provide. In its Conclusion 2010 on Sweden 
regarding Article 26 it asked that the next report contains a short description 
of the active measures taken by the government alone or in co-operation with 
employers and workers’ organisations to promote awareness, information and 
prevention of moral harassment in the workplace.89 In Collective Complaint 
No. 52/2008 the ECSR recalled that in order to satisfy Article 16 of the ESC, 
states must promote the provision of an adequate supply of housing for fami-
lies, take the needs of families into account in housing policies and ensure that 
existing housing be of an adequate standard and size considering the composi-
tion of the family in question, and include essential services, meaning that the 
state has an obligation to provide for those means.90 
Instruments on civil and political rights generally do not place obligations 
on states to fulfil nor do their monitoring bodies interpret the provisions con-
tained in them in such a way.91 However, ECtHR judges have entered this 
sphere, for example by placing an obligation on states to provide for detention 
centres of certain standards92 or to provide for medical treatment.93 
It might be true that both civil and political rights, and economic and social 
rights entail all three obligations for the state and that all three types of obliga-
tions have budgetary implications, but the fact remains that the obligation to 
fulfil tends to be the “most resource demanding, and often also the one that 
raises most questions as regards a precise description of the obligation”94 and 
most attributable to economic and social rights. 
89 ESC (Revised), ECSR, Conclusions 2010- Volume 2 (Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine), 
CoE Publishing, 2011, at p. 585.
90 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Croatia (52/2008), (2011) 52 
E.H.R.R. SE8, para. 65.
91 Although it is not always easy to discern the dividing line between the obligation to 
protect and obligation to fulfil. See Lopez Ostra v Spain (n 39).
92 Kehayov v Bulgaria App no 41035/98 (ECtHR, 18 January 2005); Orchowski v Poland 
App no 17885/04 (ECtHR, 22 October 2009); and Kalashnikov v Russia (2003) 36 
E.H.R.R. 34.
93 D. v United Kingdom (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 423. Case D. v United Kingdom is not 
directly about providing medical treatment, but by preventing D. from being 
expulsed from the UK, the ECtHR impliedly placed an obligation to the UK to 
provide him with the medical treatment. Also, there are numerous examples where 
the state was under an obligation to provide for the medical treatment of prisoners. 
94 Koch, I. E. ‘The Justiciability of Indivisible Rights’ 72 Nordic Journal of International 
Law (2003) 3, at p. 12.
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this article the theoretical approaches to civil and political rights and 
economic and social rights have been analysed together with their placement 
in the main regional and global human rights instruments. The conclusion 
that can be reached is that nowadays the classic division between civil and 
political rights as negative, subject to immediate implementation, justiciable 
and resource free, and economic, social and cultural rights as positive, progre-
ssive, non-justiciable and financially demanding, is not sustainable. With all 
the developments in human rights protection, particularly on the global and 
regional level, we can say that both civil and political, and economic and social 
rights can place both negative and positive obligations on states and financi-
al burdens, as well as being justiciable. Furthermore, both civil and political 
rights and economic and social rights can give rise to three different types of 
obligations: to respect, to protect and to fulfil. However, the implementation 
and execution of these two groups of rights is still under most human rights 
instruments somewhat different and separate. 
The fact is that a black-and-white distinction between economic and social 
on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other is not possible. 
Nevertheless, there still are certain differences among those two categories of 
rights that cannot be ignored and it cannot be said that civil and political, and 
economic and social rights are nowadays indivisible. 
To conclude with the words of M.J. Dennis and D.P. Stewart: 
“The decision to put the two sets of rights in different treaties with 
different supervisory mechanisms was well considered, and the underlying 
reasons for those distinctions and decisions appear to remain valid 
today. Their different treatment in no way disqualified economic, social 
and cultural rights as rights or relegated them to a lower hierarchical 
rung. It did reflect an assessment of the practical difficulties that states 
would face in implementing generalized norms requiring substantial 
time and resources.”95
95 Dennis, M. and Stewart, J. ‘Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights: Should 
there be an international complaints mechanism to adjudicate the right to food, water, housing 
and health?’ 98 Am. J. Int’l L. (2004) 462, at p. 465. 
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Sažetak
Maša Marochini*
GRAĐANSKA I POLITIČKA PRAVA TE EKONOMSKA I 
SOCIJALNA PRAVA – NEDJELJIVA ILI DJELJIVA PRAVA?
U današnje je vrijeme u pravnoj struci opće prihvaćeno stajalište kako građanska i 
politička prava u svojoj prirodi načelno nisu različita od ekonomskih i socijalnih te kako 
obje kategorije prava mogu nametnuti tri vrste obveza državama: obvezu poštovanja pra-
va, obvezu zaštite prava te obvezu ispunjenja uvjeta za ostvarivanje prava. Nedjeljivost 
građanskih i političkih od ekonomskih i socijalnih prava proglašena je i u zaključcima 
brojnih konferencija o ljudskim pravima. No, iako se u pravnoj teoriji od samih poče-
taka naglašava nedjeljivost i međuovisnost svih prava, u praksi su ona odijeljena. U 
ovom će se radu analizirati razlozi te nedosljednosti. Prikazat će se trenutačna pozicija 
građanskih i političkih te ekonomskih i socijalnih prava u najvažnijim međunarodnim 
i regionalnim dokumentima za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Prikazat će se i teorijski pristup 
tim dvjema kategorijama prava. Cilj je ovog rada prikazati kako su, unatoč teorijskom 
stajalištu o nedjeljivosti prava, u praksi građanska i politička prava odijeljena od eko-
nomskih i socijalnih. 
Ključne riječi: građanska i politička prava, ekonomska i socijalna prava, nedjeljivost 
prava, međunarodni i regionalni sustavi za zaštitu ljudskih prava
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